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This paper draws on Japan's experience to analyze the
merits ofconferring securities powers on banks. By issu-
ing debt andequityjointly to a single outside investor, the
shareholderbank, firms will incurlower deadweight costs
associated with bankruptcy and monitoring than if these
claims are issued to separate entities. The level ofJap-
anese banks shareholding infirms during the late 1960s is
generally consistent with this explanation offinancing
decisions. Most notably, banks as a rule provided joint
debt-equity financing rather than pure debt financing.
Moreover, holding other things constant, the level of a
bank's equity holding increasedinproportion tofinancing
it supplied the firm and to the riskiness ofinvestment.
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A broad consensus now prevails that a firm in need of
external financing for investment may incur deadweight
losses that another firm, with sufficient internal funds but
otherwiseidentical, would not. Thebasic ideais that when
a firm knows more than outside financiers about its own
prospects and/or actions that affect its prospects, external
financing will engender deadweight or "agency costs"
which ultimately fall on the firm. Credit- and equity-
rationing, the need to meet strict collateral and other
financial requirements, and resources expended on moni-
toring, are-some of the manifestations of such costs.
One important conclusion from the literature is that the
more the corporate sector relies on external funds, the
greater will bethe potential magnitude ofagency costs. In
such a setting, the extent to which the market can devise
and implement contracts which attenuate these informa-
tion-related costs will have a significant bearing on the
"real" performanceofthe economy. Financial contracts do
not materialize in a vacuum, however. The extent to which
agents can mitigate capital market imperfections is dic-
tated by the legal and institutional parameters of the
financial system itself. Notably, we employ financial con-
tracts with constraints idiosyncratic to the Anglo-Ameri-
can system, namely, the separation of commercial and
investment banking. There is no reason to believe, how-
ever, that such a systemic constraint should remain bind-
ing, much less be desirable, across time and space. Ifthe
corporate sector's dependence on external financing is
sufficiently heightened, for instance, the constraint itself
may be subject to change.
The postwarJapanese experience is a case in point. The
rapid investment-led growth from the 1950s to the early
1970sputa formidable burdenonJapan'sfinancial system.
By virtue of the pace of growth, industries' demand for
external funds was large relative to their net worth or
collateral and hence, the potential agency costs in issuing
debt and equity were commensurately high. In such a
setting, the banks, which were the primary conduit of
investable funds, were legally sanctioned simultaneously
to extend loans and to hold shares of client firms. l The
predominant mode of financial contracts during Japan's
41rapidgrowth periodthus featured the majorlenders as also
significant shareholders. Judging from the performance of
its economy, such a system appears to have met admirably
the task ofunderwriting Japan's growth.
Drawing on Japan's experience, this paper explores the
possible merits ofconferring on banks,securities powers.2
Itdoes so in twosteps. Section I motivates the relevance of
financing choice on firm value under two types of capital
markets imperfections: costly bankruptcy and imperfect
information. Two points are established here. First, the
value-maximizing financial contract will optimally trade
offthe agency cost ofdebt against that ofequity. Second,
total agency cost of external finance will be lower when
debt and equity claims are jointly issued.
If agency costs do indeed matter in firms' financing
decisions, then firm-specific parameters affecting the rela-
tive severity of the agency costs of debt versus those of
equity should explain observed interfirm differences in
ownership structure. Section II explores this issue by
focusing on the determinants of the level of the bank's
equityholding for a cross-section sampleofJapanesefirms
during the period ofrapid growth. The main contribution
here is the attempt to ascertain the effects offirm-specific
parameters on the level ofthe bank's equity claims that is
jointlyheldwithdebtclaims. This approachcontrasts with
previous studiesthathave focused ondeterminants ofmore
"conventional" measureoffirms' capital structure such as
leverage ratio. 3
I. An Agency Cost Approach to Corporate Finance4
Deadweight Costs ofExternal Financing ness. Customers may desert financially distressed firms
Consideran entrepreneurial (i.e., owner-managed) firm and suppliers may exact more favorable terms. If lenders
facing an investment that requires external financing. Its are rational, these costs will be anticipated when negotiat-
return depends on a productive input we shall refer to as ing the loans. Consequently, the expected deadweight cost
"effort," whose level is set by the owner-manager. Higher ofbankruptcy will ultimately fall on the borrower.
levels ofeffortenhancethe return onthe investment, butat The second set of imperfections relates to asymmetric
a costofincreasing the disutility incurred by the manager. information between the firm and outside suppliers of
The investment is risky because it also depends on a funds, the creditor (bank) and the new shareholder. This
random variable the manager does not control.5 gives rise to two types of incentive ~r moral hazard
The owner-manager can raise the required amount of problems. Consider first the case when new shares are
external financing by issuing debt and/or new equity. issued. As the owner-manager cedes larger proportions of
Assume that banks are the only lenders in the system.6 the firm's residual profit to the new shareholder, the effort
Furthermore, to serve as a benchmark, assume initially level, which is private information to the owner-manager,
thatbankscannotown equity; thatis, lenders inthe system will decline.
8 This obtains from a standard assumption in
cannot be shareholders. If the investment is undertaken principal-agent models: The outside shareholder (princi-
thefirm canthenbeviewedas the nexus amongthree type~ pal) shares in the fruits ofthe insider's (agent's) effort, but
of claimants: the original shareholder (the owner-man- not in the level of effort itself. As a result, the agent
ager), the new shareholder, and the lender (bank). As provides less effort than the principal deems optimal.
Modigliani and Miller (1958) demonstrated, the value of Insofaras theprofitabilityofthe firm dependsoneffort, the
the firm will be independent of its financial structure if prospective shareholder will impute the effect of this
capital markets are perfect. I motivate the relevance ofthe adverseincentivewhenpricingthefirm's equity. The inside
financing decision by the owner-manager by positing two shareholderwill therefore suffera reduction in the value of
types ofimperfections. his equity.
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First, bankruptcy is assumed to be costly in the sense Deadweight costs will arise with issues ofdebt as well.
that the transfer of assets from the shareholders to the First, the shareholder has an incentive to gain at the
creditors consumes some fraction of their total value. expense of the lender by increasing the riskiness of the
These deadweight costs include lawyers' and accountants' investment the firm undertakes. This obtains because if a
fees, andcosts incurred in auctioning offthe firm's assets. risky investment turns out to be very profitable, the share-
Though more difficult to measure, bankruptcies also im- holder captures most of the gain, while the maximum
pose indirect costs which may tum out to be even larger. 7 return to the lender is fixed to the contracted interest plus
Legaldisputes ortheperceivedconflictofinterestbetween principal. If, on the other hand, the investment fails
the shareholders and creditors ofthe firm can distract and limited liability will shield the shareholder and the lende;
constrain the managers from properly running the busi- will bear the consequences. This asymmetry in the pay-
42 Economic Review / Fall 1991off-bounded maximum downside loss but unbounded
upside return-creates an incentive for the shareholder to
invest in risky projects even ifthey have lower net present
value than a safer project.10
The rational lender will anticipate the risk-taking pro-
pensity of the shareholder and demand an interest rate
commensurate with the maximum amount ofrisk that the
firm can undertake. Inotherwords, by anticipating the full
extentofthe moralhazardrisk-shifting bythe shareholder,
the lender will preempt any possible appropriation ofhis
wealth. Butsuch a preemptive measure will provecostly to
the shareholder-and ultimately to society. Other things
equal, a higherinterestrate implies a higher probability of
bankruptcy and hence, a higher expected cost of bank-
ruptcy. In a competitive debt market, this higher expected
cost will be passed on to the shareholder.
When the level of effort is private information to the
insider, issues offixed claims to outsiders will give rise to
yet another deadweight cost. The level ofeffort set by the
manager will decline as the probability of bankruptcy
increases. This is a rational response because when the
firm is bankrupt, its ownership will fall into the creditor's
hands and the manager will not reap any return toexpand-
ing effort. Accordingly, effort will decline as interest rates
rise, since the latter implies higher probability of bank-
ruptcy. But reduced effort implies greaterprobability, and
hence greater expected cost, of bankruptcy. Again, this
deadweight cost will be passed onto the firm.
To summarize, the firm will incur deadweight losses
whetheritissues debtorequity. Substitutingdebtfor equity
substitutes one set of deadweight losses for another, but
does not eliminate them, so long as the firm needs external
financing. Under such circumstances, the firm's financing
decision will matter because by optimally trading offthe
deadweight cost ofdebt against that ofequity, total dead-
weight cost will be minimized. That firms do not exclu-
sively rely on debt oron equity presumably reflects the fact
thatsuch "cornersolutions" are not optimal from the point
ofview of minimizing agency costs.
Advantages ofJoint Debt.Equity Financing
The joint issue of both fixed and residual claims to
a single outside financier-the lender-cum-shareholder
bank-can be motivated by two sets of considerations.
The first is reductions in bankruptcy costs, direct as well as
indirect. To the extent that the debtholder already owns a
fraction of the firm, the total cost that will be incurred in
transferring the firm's asset from the shareholders to the
creditor in the event of bankruptcy will be smaller than
when these claim holders are mutually exclusive entities.
The second set of advantages concerns the efficiency
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gains in monitoring. Up to this point, ithas been assumed
that outside financiers anticipate the full extent of moral
hazard and price the firm's securities accordingly. How-
ever, the severity ofthe moral hazard problem, and hence
its deadweight costs, can be attenuated by monitoring the
activities ofthe insider. Itwill be ultimately in the interest
ofthe owner-managerto subjecthimselfto such scrutiny if
the total monitoring cost is less than the reduction dead-
weight costs that it brings about, since the insider ulti-
mately bears the agency costs in either case.
A commonly discussed pattern in the literature is that
the lender checks the borrower's propensity to undertake
risk through monitoring. 11 The outside shareholder moni-
tors the effort of the manager, who acts in the interest of
inside shareholders, and thereby enhances the net return to
the investment. As in other forms ofinformation produc-
tion, however, monitoring exhibits economies of scope.
Needless duplication of monitoring costs will be elimi-
nated by having a single outside financier, i.e., the lender-
shareholder, performing the monitoring. The idea can be
illustrated with a simple example.
Suppose that the outside shareholder incurs X units of
monitoring cost to increase the effort level ofthe manager
by de. Analogously, suppose that the lenderalso devotesX
units ofresource to reducetheriskiness ofthe firm byda2.
This will have two effects. First, the reduction in risk will
lower the bankruptcy probability and hence the expected
costofbankruptcy. Second, the loweredbankruptcyproba-
bility, in turn, will raise the marginal expected return to
effort for the owner-manager, and thus will elicit higher
effort. Thus, the shareholder's monitoring ofeffort, which
is costly, will be partly redundant as long as the lender's
monitoring of risk has some positive spill-over effect on
effort. By the same logic, the lender's monitoring ofrisk
will be redundant, in part or in whole, when the share-
holder is monitoring effort, since higher effort lowers
bankruptcy probability and hence its expected cost.
Why can't the lender and shareholder coordinate the
task ofmonitoring so as to eliminate any duplication? One
obvious obstacle to such coordination is the agency con-
flict that prevails between the two. For example, while the
lendercan safely rely onthe incentive ofthe shareholderto
monitor the effort of the manager, he cannot trust the
shareholder to monitor risk with commensurate self-inter-
est; the shareholderprefers higherto lowerrisk. Solong as
a dissonance ofinterestprevails betweenthe lenderandthe
shareholder, the bundling ofdebt and equity claims into a
single entity (i.e., the lender-shareholder bank) is a more
efficientway tocapturethe economies ofscope inmonitor-
ing, and ultimately to reduce the deadweight costs of
external financing.
43Hypotheses
While agency and bankruptcy costs provide a theoreti-
caljustification for the relevance offinancing decision, are
these costs indeed significant in reality? This question can
be addressed more formally through a number ofhypoth-
eses suggested by the theoretical framework. The most
obvious hypothesis is: if issues of debt and equity do
imposedeadweight losses, the prevalentmode offinancing
should feature the lending bank as a shareholder in the
same firm, provided, of course, that the legal system
permits it. In addition to this broadly castprediction, more
specific hypotheses emerge on interfirm differences in the
level ofequity stake held by lenders,12
HYPOTHESIS 1: the bank's shareholding will be largerthe
higher is the magnitude ofdeadweight losses holding the
probability of bankruptcy constant. As the creditor holds
larger equity stake in the firm, we would expect these
deadweight costs to decline on sheer logistic grounds: a
smaller portion ofthe firm's assets need to change hands.
More significantly, perhaps, the greater coincidence of
interest between debt and equity that obtains by definition
in a lender-shareholder financing scheme will reduce the
indirect cost ofbankruptcy, or even reduce the probability
that the firm encounters financial distress in the first place.
HYPOTHESIS 2: The higher is the firm's dependence on
the bank's funds, the higher will be the bank's equity stake
in the firm. All other things equal, the more the firm relies
onoutside financing, the higherwill be the agency costs of
debt as well as that ofequity. 13 Greater equity holding by
the bank may attenuate these deadweight costs on two
grounds. First, by structuring a greater portion of the
bank's return through equity, the expected costs of bank-
ruptcy will be reduced. Second, increased shareholding
may enhance the efficiency as well the clout ofthe bank in
checkingbothtypes ofmoralhazardsdiscussedabove, i.e. ,
risk-shifting and shirking on effort.
HYPOTHESIS 3: Holding the level of risk constant, the
higher the expected profitability of the firm, tht{ lower
should be the bank's equity holding in the firm. Higher
profitability implies lower probability of bankruptcy and
hence lower expected deadweight cost of debt. 14 On the
other hand, higher profitability will exacerbate the incen-
tive problem associated with issues of (outside) equity:
Outside financiers share an enlarged pie while the original
owner-manager incurs all the cost of making it. The two
effects combined should lead to a lower reliance on equity.
HYPOTHESIS 4: the bank's shareholding will be higherin
riskierfirms. Holdingexpected returnconstant, higherrisk
implies higherprobability ofbankruptcy and hence higher
expectedcostofbankruptcy. By structuringlargerportions
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of the bank's return through equity than debt, the proba-
bility of bankruptcy, and hence its expected cost, will be
reduced.
The collateralvalue ofthefirm is also germanehere. The
more tangible is the form ofthe firm's investment, the less
opportunity is presumably available to the firm to engage
in asset substitution that increases risk. The fraction of a
firm's assets accounted for by tangible assets is therefore a
(negative) indicator ofdiscretionary opportunities to shift
risk to lenders. The higher the firm's collateral value,
therefore, the lower will be lenders' shareholding. Em-
pirically, however, it will be difficult to untangle this risk-
attenuating aspect of collateral from lowered bankruptcy
cost considerations discussed earlier.
Application to Japan
Postwar Japan provides a fertile ground to test the
hypotheses outlined above. As noted earlier, its legal
system has allowed banks to combine corporate lending
with equity participation. Moreover, the high reliance of
the corporate sector on external funds during the 1960s
through the early 1970s suggests that the magnitude of
agency costs, and hence the incentive to mitigate them,
would have been significant. Testing the hypotheses, how-
ever, requires some institutional background on the post-
war Japanese financial system and industrial organization.
Japan's financial markets were tightly regulateduntil the
mid-1970s, when gradual deregulation was begun. One of
the main objectives of the authorities was to make indus-
trial financing the virtually exclusive preserve of Japan's
financial institutions and to limit their number by strictly
controlling entry.I5 As a result, Japan's corporate bond
market has remained thin and the number ofmajor corpo-
rate lenders limited. Excluding government financial in-
stitutions, major conduits offunds consist ofa dozen city
banks, threelong-termcreditbanks, seven trustbanks, and
large life insurance companies,!6 According to Hodder
and Tschoegl (1985) fewer than 30 financial institutions
may control over 90 percent of private lending to large
industrial firms.
As is the case elsewhere, large Japanese firms typically
procure financing from a consortium of lenders. What
distinguishes the Japaneseloanconsortium, however, is the
specialrole played by the lead or "main" bank. Although a
precise and steadfast definition cannot be assigned to the
term, a typical main bank would be a city bank, which is
the largest lender as well as a significant shareholder of a
given firm. One important function of the main bank, as
Sheard(1989) putit, is to act as adelegated monitoramong
lenders. It screens and monitors corporate borrowers on
Economic Review I Fall 1991behalf of all lenders in a given consortium.17 The main
bank also shoulders most ofthe burdenofreorganization,
bail-outs or outright liquidation when a corporate client
encounters financial distress. IS
The main banking system typically occurs within the
organizationalcontextofthe keiretsu, loosely translatedas
a corporate group. Firms belonging to these groups tend to
maintain long term relationships with one another. Intra-
keiretsu ties are maintained through informal or implicit
commitments; they are also manifest in explicit financial
commitments of reciprocal shareholding. At the fulcrum
ofeach ofthese groups are the majorcity banks. Thus, for
example, the Mitsui Bank will most likely serve as the
mainbankfor most firms belonging tothe Mitsui keiretsu.
Major city banks are themselves flanked by two or three
closely affiliated financial institutions. For example, the
Mitsuigroup includes atits financial coreMitsuiTrust and
Banking, Taisho Marine and Fire Insurance, and Mitsui
LifeInsurance Company. Inview ofthe close coordination
that is said to prevail among the keiretsu financial institu-
tions, it seems reasonable to regard them collectively as a
single economic agent; that is, for purposes of mitigating
the agency costs of external finance, it is the collective
shareholding of all keiretsu financial institutions that is
likely to matter. I therefore use this level ofaggregation to
measure the bank's shareholding in the empirical analysis
to follow. For ease of exposition, the term "main bank"
throughout the remainder of the paper will refer to the
groupofkeiretsu financial institutionscenteredaroundthe
city bank.19
II. An Empirical Test
Variables and Empirical Proxies
Main bank's shareholding. This is the dependent vari-
able in the estimated regression equations. Firm-level data
for this variable were compiled from Economic Research
Association's (KeizaiChosaKyogikai) annualpublication,
Keiretsu no Kenkyu (Research in Corporate Financial
Groups). ERA employs a primarily quantitative criterion
todefine a financial group. Ifa firm hasobtainedthe largest
amountoffinancing from the same bankfor three or more
consecutive years to date, then that firm is classified as
belonging to the bank's keiretsu. As in any exercise in
taxonomy, ambiguities inevitably arise, and the ERA ap-
plies two additional criteriafor inclusion where necessary:
(i) shareholding by group members exceed 20 percent; (ii)
historical ties.
Bankruptcy costs. Two set ofproxies were considered.
The first is the collateral value ofthe firm-defined as the
proportionoftangible assets inthe firm's totalassets-asa
negative correlate of bankruptcy cost.20,21 According to
Myers (1977), the deadweightlosses ofbankruptcy will be
morepronouncedfor intangible assets thatare linkedto the
health ofthe firm as a going concern; that is, the lower the
collateral value ofthe firm, the higher will be its expected
bankruptcy costs. For example, technical know-how, hu-
man capital, and brand image are likely to lose a greater
proportion of their values than tangible physical assets
such as plant and equipment, when the firm ceases, or is
threatenedto cease, as a going concern. Ifthis argumentis
correct, one should observe a negative relationship be-
tween the level ofshareholding by lenders and the ratio of
the firm's tangible assets to total assets.
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As is often the case, however, this empirical proxy may
not uniquely capture the theoretical attribute we wish to
measure. As already noted, collateral value may also serve
as a negative correlate ofrisk. An additional complication
concerns the so-called asset specificity effect suggestedby
Williamson (1985). The idea is that as a firm's assets
become more "specific" to existing contractual relations,
andhence lessredeployableoutsidetheserelationships, the
salvage value of the firm, given that bankruptcy occurs,
will decline; that is, bankruptcy costs rise with the degree
ofasset specificity ofthe firm and the hypothesized effect
is a greaterreliance on equity structuring the bank's return
through equity participation. One cannot rule out ex ante
the possibility that a firm's ratio offixed to total assets also
proxies for the degree of asset specificity. The two will
exert opposite effects.
The second proxy tries to capture the indirect cost of
bankruptcy. The conflict of interest between shareholders
and creditors during financial distress may seriously im-
pair the firm's capacity to take appropriate actions to stem
further deterioration. Appropriate action may entailtimely
disposal ofthe firm's rapidly depreciating assets or, alter-
natively, new investment to boost its competitiveness. In
either case, the indirect costs of financial distress may be
more acute when the firm operates in a very dynamic and
rapidly growing market. For one, the failure to keep up
with market growth, let alone shutdowns, would exact a
high toll in terms of forgone output and, perhaps more
importantly, loss in market share. The expected industry-
wide growth level was therefore included in the regression
analyses as a possible correlate of the (expected) indirect
cost offinancial distress.
45External Financing Ratio. This variable is intended to
measure the extentto which a firm relies on the main bank
to finance its investments. Itherefore computedthe ratio of
financingobtainedfrom the largestkeiretsu financial group
to total assets.
Expected Profitability. The level of profitability was
proxied by the rate ofbusiness profit defined as:
gross profit + receipts of interest plus dividends
RBP = ::..-.......:-----=---------
total assets
where gross profit is earnings before taxes and interest
payments. The choice ofthis proxy overother measures of
profitability is due to Nakatani (1984). He argues that since
totalassets equal own capital plus debt, the rate ofreturn
on total assets should include both current profits and
interest paid to financial institutions; counting current
profit alone will bias downward the rate ofreturn for those
firms with a greater debt burden.
Risk. A natural proxy for risk is a measure ofvolatility
defined as the standard deviation of the rate of business
profit.22 In addition, three other possible proxies of risk
were considered. The first is the expected growth of the
firm. It has been argued that insiders may have greater
potential to obtain information about the prospects of a
more rapidly growing firm than outsiders do. A rapidly
growing firms may also be riskier because insiders poten-
tiaHyhave greater scope and discretion to engage in risky
activities; for example, they have greater flexibility in the
choiceoffuture investments.23Theestimatedmodel there-
fore included expected sales growth as a positive indicator
ofrisk.
Second, the age ofthe firm was included to explore the
possibility that the agency costs are less severe in older
firms than in new firms. Compared to relatively mature
firms. charting familiar waters, newer firms may face
greateruncertainty, for example, exploringnew technology
ormarkets.24 Furthermore, established firms may be more
cautious aboutjeopardizingtheirreputations for the sake of
short-term gain through morally hazardous behavior.
Finally, the size offirms may also proxy for risk. Larger
firms tend to be more diversified and hence less prone to
bankruptcy risk. This implies the opposite effect on the
firm's claim structure: banks should hold lower residual
claims in larger firms. 25
Table 1 takes stock ofthe arguments presented thus far.
Data aIidEstimation Procedure
The variables were analyzed for the period 1964-1970,
because it represents the last major investment boom
(56 months ofuninterrupted growth from November 1965
46
to July 1970) before the first oil shock. Dataon the sources
of loans and shareholder composition are from Keiretsu
no Kenkyu. The year of the firm's establishment was
taken from Kaisha Nenkan [Company Annual] published
by Nikkei. All other variables were compiled from the
NEEDS corporate financial data tape which includes bal-
ance sheet, income statement, and other supplementary
accounting data at the firm level. Since the financial
settlement of the majority of firms was on a semi-annual
basis until recently, the flow data were added up compo-
nent by component. No problem was encountered on the
comparability ofdata across these different sources since
all ofthemwere ultimatelycompiledfrom the same source,
the Yuka Shoken Hokokusho-financial reports that all
listed companies are required to submit on an· annual or
semiannual basis to the Ministry ofFinance.
The sample is drawn from 635 firms that were continu-
ously listed on the First Section of the Tokyo Stock
Exchange (TSE) from 1964 to 1970 inclusive. To exclude
regulatory and other related effects, sample selection was
limitedto firms in manufacturing industries whichreduced
the sample to 468.26 The list was further pared down by
eliminating firms undergoing mergers or severance during
this period, firms with incomplete records on the variables
includedin the analysis, and firms eliminatedfrom the data
Economic Review / Fall 1991tape by Nikkei because they were either involved in
mergers or severance in the period following 1970, or
because they simply went bankrupt. The sample therefore
contains a nonnegligible degree of self-selection with a
likely bias toward relatively larger, successful firms. 27
These rounds ofelimination left a final tally of338 firms.
Theirbreakdownaccording to Nikkei's industryclassifica-
tionis reported in Table 2.
Thesamplingperiodwas dividedintotwo subperiods-
1964-66 and 1967-70-over which sample averages were
calculated. Averaging was performed to reduce measure-
ment error due to random year-to-year fluctuations in the
variables. The procedure should also serve to smooth the
effects of lumpy investments undertaken in a particular
year on accounting data. The 3-year averages of the de-
pendent variable, firm size, asset structure, and external
financing ratio were measured for the contemporaneous
period 1964-67. The variables pertaining to expectations
-profitability and growth-were measured over the pe-
riod 1967 through 1970; that is, I assume rational expecta-
tions and use the ex post realized values as proxies ofthe
values expected when the financing decision was made.28
Finally, the standard deviation ofthe change in the rate of
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business profit was measured using all seven years in the
sample in order to obtain the maximum efficiency in the
measure as possible.
Table 3 reports the summary statistics of the variables
analyzed. On average, the level of borrowing from the
group ofkeiretsu financial institutions represented a little
under24percentofthe firms' total assetorover35 percent
oftotal borrowing. A noteworthy finding isthatfor the vast
majorityofthe sample firms, the legalceilingof10percent
did Ilotappearbin.ding: The average main bank's share-
holding stood at under 11 percent. (Recall that is a collec-
tive measure which typically includes holdings ofthree or
more financial institutions.)
ThoughnotreportedintheTable, the secondnoteworthy
finding is that for close to 93 percent of the firms in the
sample, the main bank was simultaneously a lender and a
shareholder in the firm. Outofa sample of334 firms, the
instance where the main banks held outstanding loans but
held n.o stock was limited to 25 firms (7.5 percent). The
prevalent mode of financing for the sample firms thus
featured principal lenders as shareholders. Though im-
pressionistic, the finding is consistent with the postulated
efficiency ofconjoining debt and equity claims.
Our next step is to ascertain whether the cross section
data reveal a systematic pattern in the level of sharehold-
ing. Since for a small but not negligible proportion ofthe
observations on the dependentvariable assumeda limiting
47value-i.e., the bank's equity holding was zero-a max-
imum likelihood Tobit estimatorwas used.29For purposes
of comparison, an ordinary least squares estimation was
also performed.
The Results
As a preliminary step to running the regressions, a
Pearson correlation analysis was performed. The magni-
tude of collinearity among the explanatory variables was
minimal, so the results are not reported. To check for
possible industry effects on the model, a standard analysis
of variance was performed using industry dummy vari-
ables.30 Surprisingly, no statistically significant industry
effect was detected in the data.
The main empirical findings ofthis paper are contained
in Table 4.31 No material difference is discernible between
the estimated coefficients ofthe TOBIT and OLS regres-
sions. This suggests that the censoring problem was mini-
mal. Finally, different functional specifications were also
tried for possible non linear relationships between the
variables. The results turned out to be uniformly inferiorto
the linear specification and are not reported.
To begin with the proxies for bankruptcy cost, the
collateral value of the firm yielded a positive coefficient.
The model thus predicts that as the proportion oftangible
assets in total assets increases, the lender's shareholding in
the firm will increase. This clearly runs counter to the
commonly subscribed view that tangible assets lose less
value relative to intangible assets in times of financial
distress. Several interpretations are possible. Forexample,
the obtained sign may reflect the asset-specificity problem
discussed by Williamson (1985), i.e., tangible assets, as
positive correlates oftransaction-specific investment, im-
pose higher bankruptcy costs. However, it is difficult to
reconcile this argument and the prediction that higher
collateral also means lower risk and hence leads to lower
shareholding bythe main bank. In light ofthis, one cannot
dismiss the possibilitythatthe "perverse" signmay be due
to the measurement problems discussed earlier, particu-
larly with respect to the valuation of the firm's land
holdings.
The proxy for indirect bankruptcy costs-the expected
growth of the industry- yielded the predicted positive
sign; that is, the main bank tends to hold higher equity
stakesinfirms expectingmore rapidgrowth. The statistical
significanceofthe estimate is rathertentative, however. No
doubt, this reflects the considerable amount of statistical
noise that is likely to intrude on industry classifications of
the sample firms.
The most notable result is the positive and statistically
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significant coefficient (at the 1percent level) for the firm's
external financing ratio; that is, as larger fractions of the
firm's investment are financed by the main bank's funds,
the larger is the latter's equity stake in the firm. According
to the TOBITestimate, an increaseby0.111 in the external
financing ratio-one standard deviation in the sample-
increases the main bank's shareholding in the firm by 2.7
percent.32Similarconclusions canbedrawnonthe basisof
OLS results. These findings lend support to an oft-noted
observation that Japanese banks exercise considerable
influence on the firm by virtue of their shareholding.33
Economic Review / Fall 1991Although an inverse relation obtained as was predicted
between the level of main bank's shareholding and the
expectedprofitabilityofthe firm, the coefficientturnedout
to he statistically i~significant.
As. pred.ict~d, a positive relation obtained between the
main bank's shareholding and the volatility of the firm's
profit which proxiedfor risk. The estimated relationship
predictsthat an increase in volatility by the magnitude of
one standard deviation in the sample will increase the
bank's shareholding in the firm by nearly 1.7 percent. By
contrast, the secondproxy for risk, the expected growth of
the.finn did not yield a significant result. Although an
inverse relation obtained between the level of the main
bank's shareholding andthe firm's age, the coefficientwas
statistically insignificant.34 However, an inverse and sta-
tistically significant relationship did obtain between the
firm's size and the percentage ofresidual claims issued to
the bank.
III. Conclusions
OJlthe basis ofpublished accounting data, this paper
investigated the benefits ofjointdebt-equity financing, by
examining the determinants of ownership structure of
Japanese firms during the eraofrapid growth. Any test of
optimal financial structure, motivated in part or in whole
by information asymmetry, must necessarily be crude. By
definition, the researcher who must depend on publicly
availableinformationis subjecttothe very typeofinforma-
tion asymmetry faced by a firm's outside investor. In this
respect, the student ofJapanese corporate finance is espe-
cially handicapped. The statistical noise due to the poor
quality ofcorporate disclosure in Japan no doubt accounts
for a significantportionofthe sizableunexplainedvariance
that remains in the regressions.35
These limitations notwithstanding, the empirical analy-
sis did yield plausible results in support ofthe theoretical
model. For one, rarely did banks forgo the opportunity to
hold an equity stake in firms where significant lending
Federal Reserve BankofSan Francisco
lending occured. Thus, ifany efficiency gains were made
possibleby a legal systemthat conferred securities powers
to banks, they did not go unexploited. Furthermore, the
cross section evidence generally supports the view that
agency cost considerations indeed seem to matter in how
banks structure their claims in client firms. The most
notable results in this respect are that the amount ofequity
stake that the bank held inthe firm increased withthe level
of financing the bank extended to the firm and with the
level ofrisk. The bank's capacity to participate in corpo-
rate equity is crucial in "reconciling" the aggressive
lending behavior of Japanese banks during the period of
rapid growth on the one hand, and on the other, the low
level ofnetworthandhence relatively highloanrisks inthe
corporate sector. These considerations may be relevant to
policymakers in the U. S. currently faced with the task of
overhauling its banking system.
49ENDNOTES
1. In the processof dissolving the zaibatsu-the financial
"cliques" which allegedly precipitated Japan's entry into
war-the Occupation forces severely curtailed the power
ofJapanese banks in addition to outlawing intercorporate
shareholding by nonfinancial corporations. These stiff
provisions were subsequently relaxed as Japan was
poised to embark from reconstruction to rapid peacetime
growth. Reciprocal shareholding became legal again in
1949, thus ushering the way for many of the former zai-
batsu firms to regroup under the present day keiretsu.
And unlike in the United States, the city banks which form
the nuclei of these corporate groups, (along with trust
banks and insurance companies) were empowered to
hold corporate shares subject to a legal maximum. Until
1987,the legal limit was set to 10 percent of the outstand-
ing stocks of any single company; the ceiling currently
stands at 5 percent.
2. This very question was addressed also by Pozdena
(1991).
3. See for example, Kester (1986), Allen and Mizuno
(1989) and Prowse (1990).
4. This section draws heavily from Kim (1991) which pro-
vides a more formal treatment on the subject. A com-
pressed version of the formal model is sketched out in
Appendix A.
5. One can think of this variable as unforeseen events
such as bad weather, atechnological discovery, or war in
the Persian Gulf.
6. This assumption abstracts the bond market (as well
non-financial credit intermediaries) from the analysis, thus
allowing us to focus on the implication of granting equity
powers to financial intermediaries. The implicit premise
here is that in the economy under consideration, inter-
mediated debt finance (i.e., bank loans) are preferred to
direct borrowing (bonds). This could be because, as is
now widely recognized in the literature, banks possess a
comparative advantage in information production, such
as screening and monitoring borrowers. By implication,
this comparative advantage will be heightened in situa-
tions where information-related problems are acute in the
system, as is presumed here.
7. Empirical analysis on bankruptcy costs is scarce. Fre-
quently cited is a case study of a railroad bankruptcy by
Warner (1977) which finds the direct costs to be rather
negligible. But a more recent case study of corporate
reorganization in the oil industry by Cutler and Summers
(1988) suggeststhat the indirectcosts of financial distress
can be very substantial indeed. According to the authors'
estimate, the dispute between Texaco and Pennzoil over
the Getty Oil takeover imposed a deadweight loss equiv-
alent to someone-sixth of the combined wealth of the two
companies.
8. We say residual profit because the profit accruing to
shareholders consists of what remains after creditors
have been paid off. For this reason, equity is sometimes
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referred to as a "residual claim" to the firm. By contrast,
debtis a "fixed claim" since its return, provided the firm is
solvent, is invariant to the firm's profit; if the firm is insol-
vent, fixed claimants become residual claimants, i.e.,
creditors take over the ownership of the firm's assets.
9. Itis for these reasons that the distinction between the
original and new shareholders is crucial. To reflect their
different access to information, the initial owner will some-
times be referred to as the "inside share" and the new
shareholder as "outside share."
10. The distinction between the inside and outside share-
holder is not important here. The outside shareholder will
endupparticipating in the moral hazard of risk shifting to
debtholders, without necessarily being privy to the in-
sider's information or his action.
11. The moderntheoryof financial intermediation critically
hinges on the postulated efficiency of banks as monitors
in the presence of moral hazard. For example, Diamond
(1984) argues that diversification within the intermediary
enables it to monitor at a lower cost than if scattered
principals (depositors) were to monitor individually. In a
related vein, in view of the bank's superior access to the
firm's information, Fama (1985) distinguishes bank loans
as "inside debt" from the open capital market "outside
debt" such as bonds.
12. I focus on the level of equity holding by Japanese
banks and omit discussion on the leveL of debt for the
following reason. Under the rubric of the so-called "low
interest rate policy," a usury regulation on corporate lend-
ing remained in effect throughout most of the postwar
period. There is now ample evidence that banks tried to
circumventthis regulation, mostnotably by requiring firms
to post compensating balances. Reported interest rates
are likely to diverge from the effective interest 'rate and
hence, measured levels of debt may diverge substantially
from actual levels. (See, e.g., Wakita (1983)).
13. By implication, a firm will try to finance an invest-
ment project out of internal funds whenever possible and
thereby avoid the deadweight costs of going to the exter-
nal market. This option will be foreclosed, however, if
investment projects are "lumpy," i.e., project size rises in
discrete increments and the minimum.
14. Section II provides a discussion on the empirical
proxies for this and other firm-specific parameters.
15. For a concise survey of Japanese financial markets
and corporate finance, see Hodder and Tschoegl (1985).
16. The concentration ratio remains high in this industry.
At the end of 1980s, the top eight domestic life insurance
companies among atotal of 21 controlled over 80 percent
of total assets (Hodder and Tschoegl1985, p. 176).
17. See also Horiuchi et aI., (1988), Horiuchi (1989) and
Hoshi et aI., (1990a).
18. See Hodder and Tschoegl (1985), Suzuki and Wright
(1985) and Hoshi et.al. (1990b). According to Nakatani
Economic Review / Fall 1991(1984), the main raison d'etre of keiretsu and main bank-
ing is precisely to minimize the probability of encountering
financial distress through a mutual risk-sharing arrange-
ment among member firms and financial institutions.
19. The membership ofthe various keiretsu financial insti-
tutionsas well as a list of "independent" ones, Le., fi-
nancial.institutions without any keiretsu affiliation, are in
Appendix B.
20.· Another proxy for bankruptcy costs (as well as risk)
often used in the literature is the level ofR&D and advertis-
ingexpenditlJres as aproportion ofthe firm's total sa.les or
total assets. The presumption here is that these variables
measure the firm's growth opportunities, Le. they add
value to the firm but· cannot be collateralized. Unfor-
tunately,Japanese companies were not required to dis-
close expenditures on these items until the 1970s; hence
this particular proxy could not be included in the esti-
mated model.
21. Total tangible fixed assets consists of depreciable
and nondepreciable assets. Buildings and structures,
machinery and equipment, vessels and vehicles, etc.,
fall under the former category; land and construction in
progress fall under the latter. Inflation accounting was
virtually unheard of in Japan during the period under
review. Hence, assets reported in the balance sheet un-
derstate their prevailing value by a significant margin.
Corporate assets held in land are particularly problematic
given the steep increase in real estate prices during the
postwarperiod. This is doublytroublesome since land has
been one of the traditionally favored forms of collateral
required by banks. In the absence of more detailed infor-
mation on corporate land holding, any attempt at market
value adjustment, however, is likelyto introduce additional
measurement error. The empirical model was therefore
estimated using book values of assets.
22. This is a scaled measure of volatility, since business
profit was normalized by the firm's total assets.
23. See for example MacKie-Mason (1989) and Titman
and Wessels (1988).
24. These are some ofthevery reasons why de novo firms
often obtain financing through joint ventures rather than
bank loans.
25. The size of a firm will also have direct bearing on
how much bargaining power it has vis-a.-vis the bank. If
Japan's banking industries was not perfectly competitive,
greater bargaining power for the firm may imply lower
levels of residual and fixed claims issued to the bank.
26. Nonmanufacturing industries, such as communica"
tions or utilities, tend to be heavily regulated. Corporate
financing decisions will not be neutral to regulations. For
example, holding otherthings constant, a firm operating in
an industry which limits entry will be able to support a
greater amount of debt because entry barriers confer
oligopoly rent and lowers business risk. Regulated indus-
tries are also SUbject to greater public scrutiny and hence
are more limited in engaging in moral hazard.
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27. Admittedly, the moral hazard problem for these larger
firm would be much less severe than for smaller firms.
Unfortunately, as is the case elsewhere, access to data
a.boUt srna.ller(and henceunlisted) Japanesefirms isvery
limited. Criticism of self-selection bias should be tem-
pered on at least one count, however, namely, that the
dependence on external financing even for the largest
firms was very pronounced during the period under re-
view. On this ground alone, one cannot dismiss thepoten-
tial moral hazard problem as trivial. The proof of the
pudding of course is in the eating.
2B. This also obviates possible multicollinearity problems
betwe.enprofitability and external financing requirement.
Ceteris paribus, external financing ratio are lower for more
prqfitC3.ble firm.s s.ince larger fractions of investments can
be financed through retained earnings. The collinearity is
avoided when forward values of profitability are used.
29. The TOBIT technique is designed to use all observa-
tions, both those at the limit (in our case, bank's share-
holding equaling zero) and those above it, to estimate a
regression line. Tobin pioneered this technique in his
classic study of the influence income on household ex-
penditures on durable goods, where a large percentage
of the sampled households made no durable purchases
during the survey period. The idea is that since durable
goods by nature are not divisible, a certain threshold
level of income must to be reached before one actually
observes positive levels of purchase. The coefficient esti-
mated by TOBIT thus explains the change in the depend-
ent variable y in terms of two components:(1) the change
in y of those above zero, weighted by the probability of y
being greater than zero; and (2) the changein theprob-
ability of y being greater than zero, weighted by the
expected value of y given that it is greater than zero.
Generally speaking, when the dependent variable is cen-
sored, OLS estimation will yield biased estimatesof coeffi-
cients. How significant this bias is will depend on the
severity of the censoring problem.
30. The data problem discussed in footnote 20 provides
one motivation. One would expect to find systematic inter-
industrydifferences in the relative importance of R&D and
advertising expenditures: for example, pharmaceutical
firms are likely to be more research-intensive than textiles
manufacturers. Any systematic variation that remains in
the error term due to the omission of this variable will be
picked up by the industry dummy.
31. Industry dummies were not included since they were
found to be insignificant.
32. Strictly speaking, the coefficient from TOBIT estima-
tion overstates the effect ofthe explanatory variables. The
appropriate procedure is to weigh the coefficient by the
expected probability that a given observation has anon-
limiting dependent variable. Since this weight turned out
to bevirtually equal to unity, little harm is done by ignoring
this caveat. For a more l;lxtensive discussion on this issue,
see McDonald and Moffitt (1980).
5133. For example, Japanese banks are said to wield much
influence on client firms' capital spending plans. Particu-
larly noteworthy in regard tob~nks' corporate control
throughshareholdingis thelega.lprovisi()n thata.lI()ws
major shareholders to remove corpor~te directors at any
time, without cause by an ordinary resolution of a share-
holdergeneral meeting.
34. Regressions were also run with .the age variable
specified as a dummy variable, taking a value of 1 if the
firm was founded afterW.W.11 andootherwise. This did not
yield a significant estimate eitheL
35. The poor qualityofaccounting data inJapan is not an
aberration; it should be expected. Throughout most of the
postwar period, corporate finance was the virtually exclu-
sive domain of banks..By implication, banks monopolized
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on corporate monitoring and used the information in al-
locating investable funds. In the absence of any active
open issue market to speak of, the lack of public dis-
closure as deep and broadas found in the U.S. or U.K. is
natural to expect.
36. To minimize notational clutter, the firm-specificpa-
rametersJ.!.and a will be suppressed unless called for in
the analysis.
37. Notethat this amounts to saying that equity issues.do
not in themselves generate funds. This simplifying as-
surnptionisactuallyconsistenfWithJapanesecorp()ra.te
financing practice during the period under review. Vir-
tually without exception, equity was issued at a par value
of 50 yen per share. Needless to say, this issue price
represented.a negligible.fraction of the market value of
equity for most of the listed firms.
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A Sketch ofa Model ofOptimal Financial Contracts
(A3) <Pe == (1 - A)(1 - F(6*» - ue == O.
To ensure a maximum, assume <Pee < O. Implicit differ-
entiationof(A3) yieldsthedirectionofadjustmentineffort
with respect to the contract variables:
Invaluating the claimsissuedbythefirm, therationalb(lIl]c
will anticipate theseeffortresponses inadditiontochanges
in the expected cost of bankrutpcy. Consequently,. the
problemfacing the owner-manageris to choose a structure
of claims R (and hence RL since L is fixed) and A that
maximizes his expected profit (1) subject to the "budget
constraint" (A2) and the incentive constraints (A3) and
(A4). The relevant first-order condition for an interior
optimum is given by:
e* ~
e~ == (l-A)Lf(6*)/<Pee <0
(l-F(6*))/ <l>ee < 0
(A4)
This Appendix outlines a simple model ofoptimal finan-
cial contracts between an entrepreneurial firm and a share-
holder bank. The return tothe firm's investment takes the
form X == e + 6 + f.L; e denotes effort, 6 is a random
variable, and f.L is afirm-specific parameterthatindexes the
profitability.ofinvestm.ent-Return increases. in all three
variables. Unless stated otherwise, assume that 6 is uni-
formly distributed over [~, 6] with E6 == O. Denote the
spre~~of •.•• thedistributio~ ••(hence the riskiness of the
investment) by a, a == 6 -- ~ == 20.36
To procure some fixed amount of external financing,
L, the owner-manager can issue the bank a fixed claim
(i.e. debt) equal to RL, where L is the amount borrowed
and R == (1 + r) is the gross interest rate, and/or cede a
portionofhis equity A, retaining for himselfthe remaining
fraction (1 - A).37
Assuming risk-neutrality throughout, the expected profit
of the owner-manager is:
a
(AI) <P == (1 - A) J [e + 6 - RL]dF (6) u(e),
9*
where 6* == RL - e denotes the critical value of6 below
which bankruptcy occurs, and u(e) measures the disutility
that the manager associates with effort. Assume ue > 0,
uee > O. Note that because oflimited liability, the owner-
manager cares about the expected return only over the
states where the firm is solvent.
The expected profit ofthe bank is given by:
8
(A2) 'IT == RL(1-F(6*» + AJ [e+6 RL]dF(6)
9*
9*
+ J[e+6-B]dF(6)-pL ;;:: O.
9
The first term is the debt owed to the bank times the
probability thatthe firm willbe able to honorit. The second
term is the return accruing to the bank through its equity
holding, while the third is the expected value of the firm
over states where the firm defaults. Bankruptcy is costly in
the sense that the value ofthe firm is eroded by some fixed
amountB when the banktakes over ownership. Finally, the
last term represents the opportunity cost the bank associ-
ates with providing L to the firm. Competition among
banks ensures that equation (2) equals zero.
For any given combination (R, A), the managerwill set the
effort level so as to maximize his own expected profit; that
is, e* will be chosen to satisfy:
The left-hand side (LHS) of (A5) is the ratio of the
marginal response in the firm's profit with respect to the
contract variables, <PR < 0, <P~ < O. The RHS is the ratio
of the marginal deadweight costs. For issues of equity
claims (A), this deadweight cost equals the marginal re-
sponse ofthe bank's expected profit with respect to effort
times the change (decline) in effortinduced by an increase
in A. For issues of debt (R), the deadweight cost divides
into two components: 'ITeeR < 0, which has a similar
interpretation as above, and BLf, the marginal increase in
the expected cost ofbankrutpcy.
Because the optimization problem involves a nonlinear
constraint, the comparative static analysis turns out to be
quite complex. The discussion here highlights the basic
intuition underlying the adjustments in the equilibrium
valueofthebank's shareholding A*,inresponsetochanges
in firm-specific parameters. (See Kim (1991) for a more
complete treatment). From (A5), A* will depend on the
severity ofthe deadweight cost ofequity relative to that of
debt. All other things equal, therefore, the direction of
adjustment in A* will depend on how a given parameter
affects the relative severity ofthese (marginal) deadweight
costs.
Consider first an increase in bankruptcy costB which is
the most transparent case. Intuition suggests that this
increases the deadweight cost of debt relative to that of
Federal Reserve Bank ofSan Francisco 53equity and hence leads to the adjustment aA*/aB > O.
A necessary condition for this to obtain is:
(A6) a~ (7T
e
e:e ~i\BLf) < 0 --r (7Te eR-BLf)(ei\f)
- 7Te ei\(eRf - If) < O.
Rearranging and simplifying yields the inequalityL [A(l -
F(6*)) + F + Bf] > BLf, and hence aA*/aB > O.
Following a similar procedure, the direction of adjust-
ment for '11.* with respect to an increase in L, the extent to
which the firm relies onthe bank'sfunds, will hinge on the
signof
('lTeeR - BIf)['lTeeu + ei\('lTeLle + 'lTeeea]
(A7)
- 1Te ei\ ['lTeeRL + eR('lTeLle + 'lTee eL) - Bf].
With some tedious algebra it can be shown that eRL> eL>
'lTee < 0, 'lTeLle> 0 (hence 1Te ei\[e] > 0), and that 'lTe eu
+ ei\ (1TeLle + 'lTee eL) ~ 0 for all 'lTe ~ Ue(which holds for
all cases of interest). Therefore, the expression in (A7) is
negative, which in turn implies aA*/aL > O.
In contrast to the previous two cases, an increase in the
profitability of investment f.L increases the relative dead-
weight cost of equity and hence leads to a lower '11.*. A
necessary condition for such an adjustment to obtain is:
('lTe eR - BLf) ['ITe ei\fL + ei\ ('lTefLle + 'lTee efL)]
(A8)
- 'lTe ed'lTeeRfL + eR('lTefLle + 1Tee e,.,,)] > O.
Itis relatively straightforward to show that efL > 0, eRfL
=0, ei\fL' 'lTefLle < 0 and hence that 'lTe ede] < O. A
negative (or zero) value for the expression inside the first
setaLsquare brackets is thus sufficient to establish the
inequality in (A8). After some manipulation this can be
shownJo holdunambiguously for cases where 'lTee > <Pee'
i.e., the marginal return to effort diminishes faster for the
firm than the bank.
Finally, intuition suggests that increased riskiness
shouldleadto a greater issue of '11.*. Itturns out, however,
thatthe actual direction of adjustment is sensitive to the
distributional assumption as well as to the initialequi-
libriumvalue ofA* andR * (and hence to the initialdefault
probability). Full treatmenton this issue exceeds the scope
ofthis paper. Instead, we simply state the result here that
aA*/au > 0 obtains with the least degree ofambiguity for
cases af(e*)/au > 0 where u indexes the riskiness ofthe
distribution. Theintuitionis simple. Allotherthingsequal,
the relative severity of deadweight cost associated with
debt rises ifgreater riskiness increases the marginal dead-
weight cost ofbankruptcy, BLf.
AppendixB
Keiretsu Affiliations ofFinancial Institutions, 1964-70
Affiliated Banks
Mitsui Group:
Mitsui Bank, Mitsui Trust and Banking, Taisho Marine
and Fire Insurance, Mitsui Life Insurance Company.
Mitsubishi Group:
Mitsubishi Bank, Mitsubishi Trust and Banking, Tokio
Marine and Fire Insurance, Meiji Life Insurance
Company.
Sumitomo Group:
Sumitomo Bank, Sumitomo Trust and Banking, Sumi-
tomo Marine and Fire Insurance, Sumitomo Life Insur-
ance Company.
Fuyo (Fuji) Group:
Fuji Bank, Yasuda Trust and Banking, Yasuda Fire and
Marine Insurance, Yasuda Life Insurance Company.
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Sanwa Group:
Sanwa Bank, Toyo Trust and Banking, Daido Life
Insurance Company.
Dai-Ichi Group:
Dai-Ichi Bank, Asahi Life Insurance Company.
Unaffiliated Banks
Long-Term Credit Banks:
Industrial Bank of Japan, Long-Term Credit Bank of
Japan, Nippon Credit Bank
City Banks:
Hokkaido Takushoku Bank, Bank of Tokyo, Daiwa
Bank, Tokai Bank, Kyowa Bank, Kobe Bank, Nippon
Fudosan Bank, Norin Chuo Kinko
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